Abstract: Security issue of sensor networks is greatly different from that of conventional networks, in terms of its specific requirements, constrained resources of nodes, and variety of network characteristics. The security architecture of sensor networks is proposed, trying to outline a general illustration on this area. The following three topics are discussed: 1) Security primitives such as SKE, MAC and PKC; 2) Various keying mechanisms for the key management issue; 3) Joint considerations on network-related issues including routing, energy and fault tolerance.
Introduction
Dramatic improvements in micro-electro-mechanical systems (MEMS) technology, combined with advanced Notes that sensor nodes are typically low cost, taking responsibility for sensing and data aggregation [2] , it is impossible for sensors to load sufficient security services. In addition, we still lack necessary support on node identification from network layer [3] . On the contrary, conventional security focuses on a single entity to achieve system security based on securing every individual in the network. Based on the available security primitives supported by current cryptography research, we address the key management issues and inspect the performance of security mechanisms in network environment. The essential problem of the formal item is how to construct variant identity-based keying infrastructures to achieve necessary individual security. While on the latter one, the security issue is analyzed systematically based on network-wide communications, with widened constraints caused from network routing, energy consumption and etc., in order to make those schemes more adaptive and scalable to sensor networks. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives an overview on sensor network security, with a summary of security properties on different levels. Section 3 presents discussions on variant security primitives. Section 4 provides a detailed analysis of the key management issues; and multi-issue related security mechanisms are addressed in Section 5. To make this survey more comprehensive, other related issues are provided in Section 6, and the paper is concluded in Section 7.
Overview of Sensor Networks Security
In this section, we generally describe the following aspects of sensor networks: constrained conditions, security requirements and security architecture.
Constrained conditions
• Topology maintenance. Sensor nodes are assumed to be deployed throughout the sensor field before the network begins to work. There are three phrases related to network topology maintenance and change:
pre-deployment and deployment phase, post-deployment phase and re-deployment of additional nodes phase. Normally global or local sensible information is pre-loaded on a sensor node in the first phase. In the latter two deployment phases, network topologies are prone to frequent changes due to node device failure, varying task dynamics, and addition of the new nodes.
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• Hardware constraints. References [4, 5] provide detailed performance parameters for prototype of their own productions. For example, Smart Dust nodes are equipped with 8-bit processor, 512 bytes RAM, and 8Kbytes flash memory for instructions execution. Only 4500 bytes are available for application code space. Although hardware performance has improved greatly according to the latest figures offered by Ref. [6] , and definitely the development will maintain fairly high speed in the future, the available resources of sensor nodes are still very tight.
•
Energy constraints. For every sensor node, power consumption is divided into three domains: Sensing, communication and data processing. Reference [7] shows that a sensor node expends maximum energy in data communication. Thus the design of algorithms and protocols is inevitably influenced by the corresponding power expenditures. However, we still lack comprehensive figures for quantitative analysis.
• Inability of tamper resistance. As sensor nodes may be deployed in hostile or unattended areas, they would take much risk of physical attack by an adversary. In the worst case, sensible information stored in a sensor node may be compromised, causing some part of the network vulnerable to security attack.
Security requirements

Security goals
Various security requirements on sensor networks are presented in almost all the related papers [4, 9, 10] . As a summary, we classify those requirements into three security levels:
• Message-Based level. Similar with that in conventional networks, this level deals with data confidentiality, authentication, integrity and freshness. Symmetric key cryptography and message authentication codes are necessary security primitives to support information flow security. Also data freshness is necessarily required as lots of content-correlative information is transmitted on a sensor network during a specific time.
• Node-Based level. Situations such as node compromise or capture are investigated on this level. In case that a node is compromised, loaded secret information may be improperly used by adversaries.
• Network-Based level. On this level, more network-related issues are addressed, as well as security itself.
A major benefit of sensor networks is that they perform in-network processing to reduce large streams of raw data into useful aggregated information. Protecting it is critical. The security issue becomes more challenging when discussed seriously in specific network environments. Firstly, securing a single sensor is completely different from securing the entire network, thus the network-based anti-intrusion abilities have to be estimated. Secondly, such network parameters as routing, node's energy consumption, signal range, network density and etc., should be discussed correlatively. Moreover, the scalability issue is also important with respect to the redeployment of node addition and revocation.
Performance metrics
As addressed above, it's definitely insufficient to access a scheme based on its ability to provide secrecy.
Reference [10] proposes the following evaluation metrics:
• Resilience against node capture. On the network-based level, the fraction of total communications that are compromised is required to be estimated once a capture of several nodes occurs.
•
Resistance against node replication. This issue needs to be seriously investigated as the captured node may be cloned and thus adversaries gain more control of the network.
Revocation. Like regular process on node addition, the revocation mechanism is always necessary for detection and insulation of the misbehaving nodes. 
Security architecture of sensor networks
In order to give a general view on security issues addressed in sensor networks, we present the security architecture of sensor networks in Fig.1 . As described above, three-level security requirements outline the principles of algorithm design on security mechanisms. We list the corresponding issues for each level in detail. In order to achieve securing available communications and applications in sensor networks, such as identity authentication, routing, data aggregation and etc., most security researches focus on the following three aspects: security primitives, key management and network-related security strategies. Security primitives manage a minimal protection to information flow and a foundation to create secure protocols. Those security primitives are systematical key encryption (SKE), message authentication codes (MAC), and public key cryptography (PKC). Table 1 gives a brief performance comparison of the several famous symmetric algorithms.
• Encryption mode and data freshness. In order to achieve semantic security, the counter (CTR) mode is normally used since the same plaintext sent at different times is encrypted into different ciphertext. Data freshness can be achieved by creating a random nonce N M , along with the request message to the receiver.
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• Message authentication. In order to achieve authentication and message integrity, message authentication code is needed. As the generated block ciphers can be reused, CBC-MAC is generally adopted. In addition, it is efficient and fast, and reduces the memory footprint needed for the MAC calculations. 
Costliness of basic operations:
The workhorse of the IDEA is the multiply instructions, while for RC5 it is rotations. Performance comparison: A. RC5 is normally faster than RC4 due to 32-bit word operations. B. RC5 is 1.5 times faster than IDEA.
Possible energy reduction:
AES can reduce up to 33.05%, Kasumi 16.6% and DES 10% energy cost due to optimization method adopted.
Probable application of public-key cryptography
PKC issue in sensor networks has long been considered as "not possible" due to hardware constraints of sensors. However, there is almost no quantitative analysis that supports this widely accepted conclusion. To the best of our knowledge, the first attempt on feasibility of PKC utilization in sensor network environment is Ref. [8] , which is based on available network production ZigBee [5] . In such a network, a new entity called security manager is involved, whose hardware resources are sufficient for public-key operations. The authors of Ref. [8] propose a hybrid authentication key establishment scheme based on ECC (elliptic curve cryptography). The scheme puts the cryptographic burden on security manager, eliminates high-cost public-key operations at sensor side, thus achieves authentication between a sensor and a security manager during key establishment.
However, in the hybrid scheme sensors are also assumed unable to perform PKC operations. Reference [14] presents the implementation of ECC over F 2p for sensor networks based on MICA2 [15] mote. Related figures show that public keys can be generated within 34 seconds, and the distribution among nodes of shared secrets is also achieved within reasonable costs. The latest research [16] begins to focus on optimization of the essential operations in PKC such as public key authentication. As symmetric-key based protocols are complicated and always subject to attack by adversaries, PKC utilization would be the next research focus in sensor networks security along with preliminary achievements on development of the related productions.
Key Management Issues
Key management plays a very key role in deploying security strategies of sensor networks, including key pre-distribution, key discovery and key maintenance. Since a sensor node couldn't predetermine which nodes will be its direct neighbors before deployment phase, it is essential to bootstrap the establishment of a secure communication infrastructure during the pre-deployment phase. In this section, two different kinds of keying infrastructures are presented.
Multiple keying infrastructure
A single keying protocol will not be optimal for sensor network topologies, densities, sizes and scenarios [17] .
Different types of keys are required to satisfy different security requirements, i.e., encryption of sensor readings, authenticated indications and etc. In addition, keys are also used as proofs of the owner's identity due to the lack of asymmetric key algorithm support at present.
PRF-Based key establishment
Hence how to achieve different key establishments becomes focus of the related algorithm design.
Mathematically supported by the one-way property of pseudo-random function (PRF) [18] , PRF-based key establishment enables each node to compute a key shared with the others. Assume that {f K } is a family of pseudo-random functions, from a key K, a node can derive other keys with various inputs, as K0=f K (0) for encryption and K1=f K (1) for authentication.
Related security mechanisms
• LEAP [9] LEAP supports the establishment of four types of keys for each sensor node: an individual key shared • LiSP [19] Regarding data-centric routing and possible multi-level communication architecture, more attention is focused on the group-heads (GH) rather than a single sensor node. Message key (MK) sequences are used for encrypting/decrypting data packets with frequent renewal mechanisms on group communications. The proposed protocol uses authentication key instead of individual key for reducing its function to only verification on a node's identity.
Advantages and insufficiencies
• Advantages. By the establishment of those kinds of keys, a secure path between a node and BS (or CH according to the related architecture) has formed. Scalability is achieved well based on this kind of infrastructure as it supports various communication patterns, and it is effective in the key discovery phase, without a prior knowledge of post-deployment configuration and message exchange. Moreover, the meaning of group key could be expanded for purpose of securing hierarchical routing [3, 20] in current sensor networks..
•
Insufficiencies. Considerable CPU performance is required. Every sensor node needs to keep global information of the network, thus additional process mechanisms are required for possible alternate topology. Moreover, the security of this infrastructure is based on a common random function, and the security of that kind of function is not addressed. Furthermore, current research [14] shows that pseudo-random number generator has a negative effect on performance as it relies solely on a node's unique ID for seeding.
Pairwise keying infrastructure
Current Research pays more and more attentions on practical pairwise key pre-distribution scheme, which enables any two sensors to communicate securely with each other. The essential problem of the pairwise key issue has two aspects: One is how to enable any two sensors to share a common key with minimum key information required for every sensor node. The other is how to perform localized key establishment, preventing possible network failure once a small number of nodes are compromised. In terms of pairwise key scheme, there are two extreme design cases: Probabilistic key distribution and polynomial pool-based key distribution.
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Probabilistic key distribution
Totally different from the schemes described above, probabilistic key distribution scheme is designed to make sure that at least a key-shared path exists in "almost certain" situation. Reference [21] puts forward the idea of probabilistic key-sharing and related shared-key discovery protocol, which makes a significant contribution on that kind of algorithm design. This scheme picks a random pool (set) of keys S out of the total possible key space. For each node, m keys are randomly selected from the key pool S and stored into the node's memory. This set of m keys is called the node's key ring. The number of keys in the key pool |S| is chosen such that two random subsets of size m in S will share at least one key with some probability p.
The authors of Ref. [21] abstract a sensor network as a random graph G(n,p), with the wireless communication rang limit n′, where n denotes the number of sensor nodes, p the probability that a link exists between any two nodes. Given a desired global probability P c for graph connectivity, ln( ) ln( ln( )) c n p n P − − = is held. Let d be the expected degree of a node, thus
where p′ is the probability that any two nodes share at least one key. As a key ring is randomly generated and pre-loaded to each node,
can be achieved. Thus the relationship between |S| and m can be determined for a desired P c . For example, if n=10,000 and we want this network to be "almost certainly" connected with probability P c =0.99999, then every node should have a key ring size of m=200 for a pool size of |S|=100,000 keys, under the assumption that each node has a wireless neighborhood connectivity of 40 nodes.
Reference [10] makes improvements on security strength, which requires q common keys (q>1), instead of just one. The composite K takes the form of K=hash(k 1 ||k 2 ||…||k q ). Figures show that the amount of key overlap increases, so does the resilience of the network against node capture.
Polynomial pool-based pairwise key predistribution
As addressed above, a bivariate t-degree polynomial is used to generate keys. However, this polynomial-based key pre-distribution scheme can only tolerate no more than t compromised nodes, and the value of t is limited due to the memory constraints of sensor nodes [22] . The idea of a pool of multiple random bivariate polynomials is desirable. The basic idea of the polynomial pool-based scheme can be considered as the expansion on the meaning of "key". That is, this scheme is also based on the concept of "key pool", whereas keys are expressed as different polynomials. Ref. [23] presents an instantiation on this idea, modeling a sensor network with a total of N sensor nodes as an n-dimensional hypercube. Thus the problem of pairwise key establishment is transformed to the connectivity issue in the hypercube model.
Pairwise key predistribution with deployment knowledge
For most of the applications, the sensors have low mobility, and it is reasonable to conclude that although it is difficult to precisely pinpoint sensors' positions, it is often possible to approximately determine their locations. That is, a sensor is usually within a certain distance from its target location. By taking advantage of this observation, a location-aware deployment model for static sensor networks is developed in Ref. [24] . Similarly, [25] proposes a pairwise key pre-distribution scheme using deployment knowledge. As sensors are assumed to be pre-arranged in a sequence of smaller groups and then be dropped out sequentially, it is also reasonable to conclude that sensor groups dropped next to each other have a better chance to be close to each other on the ground.
By pre-distributing the secret keys among the sensors before deployment, key pool based pairwise key techniques are energy-efficient. Their goal is to use less memory to achieve a higher level of connectivity. However, a small number of compromised nodes may reveal a large fraction of pairwise keys shared between regular nodes.
Due to the limitation on memory, it is difficult to achieve both a high connectivity and a perfect resilience. The
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following points need to be considered on the design of pairwise key schemes: 1) Avoiding pre-loading global sensible information on each node if possible; 2) Integration of multiple analysis model helps promote working performance as a whole; 3) Routing issue is necessarily to be addressed as it is not possible to transmit messages directly from one node in the network to another.
On the other hand, PKC techniques would eliminate the above problem. Because of its asymmetry property, sensors do not need to preload the keys among the sensors. The main focus of using PKC in sensor networks is on its expensive computation and communication overhead. Hence, it is in a dilemma to choose pairwise key or PKC.
Recently, an extensive set of papers have studied pairwise key management schemes. We believe PKC will be another attractive research field for sensor networks in the coming years.
Group key issue
In some situations, sensors in adjacent areas are assumed to organize themselves to cooperate and fulfill a certain tasks. Different from clusters addressed in hierarchically organized sensor networks, a sensor group is normally created dynamically, according to specific commands emitted by the base station. Once a group is generated, the most important problem in group communication is group key management issue, including such aspects as dynamic distribution and negotiation of the initial key for a newly created group, group rekeying due to node addition or revocation, and group-identity based key scheme to secure multi-hop route to the based station.
Among those three aspects, the group rekeying issue has attracted research interest as it deals with how to prevent continuous attacks with respect to node compromise and topology maintenance. PCGR (predistribution and local collaboration-based group rekeying) schemes are proposed in Ref. [26] , based on the idea that future group keys can be preloaded to the sensor nodes before deployment, and neighbors can collaborate to protect and appropriately use the preloaded keys. However, in this field few research achievements are available on dynamic group establishment at present.
Multi-Issue Related Security Mechanisms
So far as we have introduced, we still lack a comprehensive view on network security from a system level. Key management issues are discussed for the purpose of achieving individual security, which is largely different from that of the entire network. Moreover, separated from considerations of network-related issues, a security mechanism would lose its practical value on applications. That is, the realization of various security schemes is greatly influenced by different requirements from upper applications, services provided by the lower layers, and constraints due to the properties of sensor networks. Those factors include largely different network scale, packet loss, load balancing, energy consumption, routing aware property and etc. However, research achievements on this area are still on preliminary stage at present. authenticates the packets received at a time interval δ before it is actually broadcasted by the sender. However, µTESLA is designed for base station broadcast. It is much more complicated when this issue is addressed in node-based broadcast.
Authenticated broadcast in a time
Energy-Effective and routing-aware issues
• Routing-Based considerations SPINS [4] has also addressed a measurable analysis on energy costs of adding security protocols as well as µ TESLA. Experimental figures based on SNEP protocol analysis show that most of the overhead arises from the transmission of extra data rather than from any computational costs. However, a security scheme only based on such hierarchy will consume much more energy if the network and physical layer information is not jointly considered [27] . It reveals a contradiction between logical hierarchy and hierarchical routing. Although various keying mechanisms are available, most of these mechanisms are irrelative to the issues of routing and network topology. We believe pairwise or group keys must be established and maintained on a hop-by-hop basis.
• Security level corresponding to energy cost Possible communication security threats may cause different degrees of criticality on various types of messages in the sensor network. The idea of customized security mechanisms is to classify the data existing in the network into different security levels [28] . Normally the messages on the higher lever are less frequent than those on the lower lever on information exchange. Thus it's practical and meaningful to adopt cost-effective security mechanisms on lower level messages, while on the highest level, strong encryptions are required in spite of the resulting overhead.
• Improving security without additional energy
Reference [29] applies NOVSF (non-blocking orthogonal variable spreading factor) code-hopping technique in security design without utilizing additional power for implementation. NOVSF codes are computed by assigning data blocks to time slots, where different permutations are used in every session. As a base station periodically updates mapping permutations, an adversary would have to first find the mapping pattern for the particular session before security attack on sensor nodes.
Fault-Tolerance
• One way hash-based key recovery
It is not uncommon to occur message loss due to the instantaneous failure of the network. By adopting a key-buffer with t length and applying hash computation repeatedly, a node can recover up to t lost session keys (MK) [19] . The preconditions of such a mechanism are: 1) the whole system is loosely time synchronized; 2) the node for key recovery should receive the authenticated key sequences not beyond the interval of t×T refresh (refreshment interval).
• Seamless MK re-keying
The idea of seamless re-keying [19] is motivated by the challenge that how to switch to the new session key without disrupting the ongoing data transmission. ReKeyingTimer and key-slots are adopted to meet such requirement. The two key-slots are used to store the two keys, denoted as {MK 1 ,MK 2 }, one is for current data encryption, and the other is for the nearest future. On receiving Initkey packet, a sensor node then sets
ReKeyingTimer that expires after T refresh /2. When the timer expires, the node switches the active key to MK 2 ,
replacing MK 1 in the key-slot. The following key sequences are shifted to cover the place MK 2 once stored. The node then sets ReKeyingTimer to expire after T refresh for future key switching. Reference [30] points out that the base station may be more vulnerable than normal nodes to some degree, and considers strategies against a variety of threats that can lead to the failure of the base station.
• DoS-resistance issue. References [31, 32] list various kinds of DoS attacks probably occur in sensor networks. For the purpose of promoting DoS-resistance capability on routing, Ref. [33] proposes a security mechanism to make sure another disjoint secure path available even if an intruder takes down a single node or path. However, factual situations are far more complicated than what the authors have addressed.
• IDS issue and node misbehavior detection. IDS (intrusion detection system) is commonly used in conventional networks, while it can hardly be applied to sensor networks at present as IDS agent is fairly expensive, and how to distribute the detection tasks over the nodes still remains a problem. The first attempt to achieve basic function of IDS is to detect possible misbehaviors of isolated nodes. Reference [10] proposes a distributed voting system to estimate the reliability of a nodes based on votes of several nodes. However, challenges arise as it still lacks an effective mechanism to deploy trust strategies between inner-network entities.
Conclusions
Although research on sensor networks security has achieved many notable results as addressed above, opportunities still remain in this area. On one hand, with the promotion of node's hardware performance and further research achievements, former accepted assumptions are more likely to be unsuited. Available examples are addressed in this paper such as PKC utilization. On the other hand, more challenges arise due to the continuous change of requirements. Areas are yet unexplored including optimization of security mechanisms in terms of resources and network environment, group re-keying infrastructure, and effective detection on DoS attacks. With respect to the security architecture, future research would possibly focus on cost-effective cryptographic algorithms, feasible IDS strategies over the network, and the scalability of security mechanisms regarding various performance metrics.
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